Part 4

Some of SOPs

🚨 Exploitation of Remote Services

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is Exploitation of Remote Services?

Exploitation of Remote Services occurs when attackers abuse vulnerabilities in remote services (e.g., RDP, SMB, SSH, FTP) to gain unauthorized access to systems.
Common remote services targeted include:
- Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
- Server Message Block (SMB)
- Secure Shell (SSH)
- Telnet
- FTP

📑 Why Attackers Exploit Remote Services?

Initial Access: Gain foothold on a target system.
Privilege Escalation: Exploit misconfigurations or weak credentials.
Persistence: Maintain long-term access.
Lateral Movement: Move across systems within the network.
Data Exfiltration: Steal sensitive information.

📌 Common Exploited Services and Techniques

Service

Common Exploitation Techniques

Example Tools

RDP

Brute Force, Credential Stuffing, RDP BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708)

xfreerdp, Hydra

SMB

EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144), SMBGhost (CVE-2020-0796)

Metasploit, Impacket

SSH

Credential Stuffing, Weak Key Exploitation

Hydra, CrackMapExec

FTP

Anonymous Login Exploitation, Directory Traversal

Nmap, Hydra

Telnet

Default Credential Exploitation

Hydra, Metasploit

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

🕵️ Check Active Remote Sessions

qwinsta

🕵️ Review RDP Connection Logs

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4624} | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*RDP*" }

🕵️ Check for Suspicious SMB Connections

Get-SmbSession | Select-Object ClientComputerName, UserName, SessionId

🕵️ Review Active SSH Connections

netstat -ano | findstr ":22"

🕵️ Identify Failed Login Attempts

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625}

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

🕵️ Detect Suspicious Remote Login Attempts

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4625
| where AccountName != "defaultaccount"
| summarize FailedAttempts = count() by AccountName, IpAddress
| where FailedAttempts > 5

🕵️ Identify SMB Exploitation Attempts

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemotePort == 445
| where ActionType == "ConnectionFailed"
| summarize count() by RemoteIP
| where count_ > 10

🕵️ Monitor RDP Brute Force Attempts

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4625
| where LogonType == 10 or LogonType == 7
| summarize FailedAttempts = count() by IpAddress, AccountName
| where FailedAttempts > 5

🕵️ Detect EternalBlue Exploitation Patterns

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName contains "ms17-010"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName

🕵️ SSH Access Attempts

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemotePort == 22
| where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| summarize ConnectionCount = count() by RemoteIP, AccountName
| where ConnectionCount > 5

🕵️ Monitor FTP Connections

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemotePort == 21
| where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| summarize ConnectionCount = count() by RemoteIP, AccountName

📊 Event Viewer Logs

Event ID

Description

4624

Successful logon.

4625

Failed logon attempt.

4776

The computer attempted to validate credentials.

4648

A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.

4672

Special privileges assigned to new logon.

📌 Focus on Event ID 4625:

Repeated login failures from a single IP address.

📌 Focus on Event ID 4672:

Look for privileged account logins from suspicious IPs.

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Trace Failed Authentication Attempts

Analyze failed authentication patterns:

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625} | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*RDP*" }

2️⃣ Identify Active Remote Sessions

List active RDP sessions:

qwinsta

Check SMB Sessions:

Get-SmbSession

Look for suspicious processes:

Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.Path -like "*Temp*" }

4️⃣ Check Open Ports

Verify open ports for remote services:

netstat -ano | findstr ":3389 :445 :22"

5️⃣ Review Suspicious Network Connections

Identify remote connections:

Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -notlike "192.168.*" }

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Terminate Unauthorized Sessions

logoff <SessionID>

📌 2. Disable Unused Remote Services

Set-Service -Name TermService -StartupType Disabled

📌 3. Reset Compromised Accounts

net user Administrator NewP@ssw0rd!

📌 4. Block Suspicious IPs

New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Block Suspicious IP" -Direction Inbound -RemoteAddress <IP> -Action Block

📌 5. Patch Known Vulnerabilities

Apply patches for vulnerabilities like BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) and EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144).

📌 6. Enable Network Level Authentication (NLA) for RDP

reg add "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v UserAuthentication /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

📌 7. Perform Full Antivirus Scan

Start-MpScan -ScanType FullScan

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

Disable Unused Remote Services:
- Turn off RDP, SMB, FTP, and Telnet if not needed.
Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):
- Add MFA to remote access.
Apply Network Segmentation:
- Isolate systems with sensitive remote services.
Use Strong Password Policies:
- Enforce complex passwords.
Patch Systems Regularly:
- Keep systems updated to prevent exploitation.
Enable Account Lockout Policies:

powershellنسخ الكودnet accounts /lockoutthreshold:5

Monitor Service Logs:
- Regularly review Event IDs 4625, 4672, 4648.

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

Remote Services Are Prime Targets: Monitor RDP, SMB, SSH, and FTP.
Patch Known Vulnerabilities: Keep services updated.
Implement Logging and Auditing: Enable Event IDs 4625, 4672.
Use Network Segmentation: Restrict access to critical services.
Apply Least Privilege Principle: Limit admin access on remote services.

🚨 File and Directory Discovery: Advanced Threat Analysis

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is File and Directory Discovery?

File and Directory Discovery involves identifying sensitive files, folders, and directories on a compromised system.
Attackers use discovery techniques to:
- Locate sensitive data (e.g., credentials, configuration files).
- Identify critical system directories for further attacks.
- Determine backup locations and log files.
- Plan data exfiltration paths.

📑 Why Attackers Use File and Directory Discovery?

Gather Information: Locate files with sensitive data (e.g., .env, config.xml, password.txt).
Privilege Escalation: Identify configuration files with hardcoded credentials.
Persistence: Locate startup folders for persistence mechanisms.
Data Exfiltration: Identify large or important datasets for exfiltration.
Evasion: Identify antivirus logs or security tools to bypass them.

📌 Common Techniques for File and Directory Discovery

Technique

Command/Tool Example

Description

List Directories

dir /s (Windows), ls -R (Linux)

Recursive directory listing

Search for Sensitive Files

find / -name *.env

Search for specific file types

Locate Hidden Files

ls -la

Reveal hidden files

Check Startup Folders

dir C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup

Identify persistence locations

System Configuration Files

cat /etc/passwd (Linux)

Extract system user information

PowerShell Enumeration

Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Force

Recursive file discovery in PowerShell

📊 Common Tools Used

Tool

Purpose

PowerShell

Recursive file enumeration

CMD (dir)

Directory listing

Findstr

Search within files

Find (Linux)

Search for files by name or type

grep (Linux)

Search within files

Tree

Visual directory structure

WinPEAS/LinPEAS

Enumerate sensitive files and configurations

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

🕵️ Identify Suspicious File Searches

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4688} | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*dir*" -or $_.Message -like "*find*" }

🕵️ Monitor Access to Sensitive Files

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*" -Recurse -Include "*.env", "*.xml", "*.config", "*password*"

🕵️ Check Recent File Access

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastAccessTime -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24) }

🕵️ Look for Hidden File Access

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\" -Hidden -Recurse

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

🕵️ Detect Directory Listing Commands

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "dir" or ProcessCommandLine contains "ls"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName

🕵️ Identify Sensitive File Access

DeviceFileEvents
| where FileName matches regex ".*(password|config|credentials|backup).*"
| where ActionType == "FileAccessed"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, AccountName

🕵️ Monitor Recursive Directory Scans

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-Recurse" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/s"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName

🕵️ Look for Startup Folder Access

DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath contains "Startup"
| where ActionType == "FileAccessed"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, AccountName

🕵️ Track Access to System Configuration Files

DeviceFileEvents
| where FileName contains "passwd" or FileName contains "shadow"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, AccountName

📊 Event Viewer Logs

Event ID

Description

4688

A new process was created (e.g., dir, find, grep)

4663

Object access attempt (e.g., file read/write)

4660

An object was deleted

4656

A handle to an object was requested

📌 Focus on Event ID 4688:

Look for commands like:
- dir /s
- ls -R
- find / -name
- grep password

📌 Focus on Event ID 4663:

Monitor file access activity:
- password.txt
- config.xml
- sensitive_data.zip

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Identify Suspicious File Access Commands

Search executed commands related to file discovery:

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4688} | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*dir*" -or $_.Message -like "*find*" }

2️⃣ Trace Process Tree

Identify parent and child processes of discovery commands:

Get-CimInstance Win32_Process | Where-Object { $_.ParentProcessId -eq <PID> }

3️⃣ Inspect Access to Sensitive Folders

Check critical directories:

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*" -Recurse -Include "*.env", "*.xml", "*.config"

4️⃣ Identify Recently Accessed Files

List files accessed in the last 24 hours:

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastAccessTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }

5️⃣ Analyze Command History

Inspect PowerShell command history:

(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath | Get-Content

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Revoke Unnecessary File Permissions

icacls "C:\SensitiveFolder" /inheritance:r

📌 2. Monitor Critical Directories

Enable File Integrity Monitoring (FIM).

📌 3. Quarantine Suspicious Processes

Stop-Process -Name "cmd" -Force

📌 4. Remove Unauthorized Access

Disable compromised accounts:

Disable-LocalUser -Name "suspiciousUser"

📌 5. Perform Full Antivirus Scan

Start-MpScan -ScanType FullScan

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

Enable File Auditing:
- Monitor Event IDs 4663, 4688.
Implement Least Privilege Access:
- Limit access to sensitive folders.
Monitor Sensitive File Access:
- Alert on unauthorized access to files like password.txt, config.xml.
Disable Command-Line Access for Non-Admins:
- Restrict tools like cmd.exe, powershell.exe.
Use File Integrity Monitoring (FIM):
- Detect unauthorized changes to sensitive files.
Educate Users:
- Train users to recognize unauthorized file access patterns.

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

File Discovery is Often Reconnaissance: Attackers seek sensitive data before launching further attacks.
Focus on Command-Line Patterns: Commands like dir /s, ls -R, find / are key indicators.
Audit Sensitive Folders: Regularly monitor access and modifications.
Implement File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Detect unauthorized file access.
Enforce Least Privilege Principle: Restrict file access to only necessary users.

🚨 Persistence via Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is Persistence via Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder?

Persistence ensures an attacker maintains access to a compromised system across reboots or interruptions.
Attackers often use:
- Registry Run Keys: Automatically execute malicious code at system startup.
- Startup Folder: Place malicious files in folders that run programs at user login.

📑 Why Attackers Use These Techniques?

Stealth: Blend into legitimate startup processes.
Reliability: Ensure malware executes every time the system reboots.
Ease of Access: Run keys and startup folders are often overlooked in security audits.
Flexibility: Works across Windows versions and configurations.

📌 Common Techniques for Persistence

Technique

Description

Registry Key/Folder

Registry Run Key

Run malicious code at startup.

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

RunOnce Key

Run code only on the next startup.

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce

Startup Folder

Add malicious files to startup directory.

C:\Users\<User>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup

Scheduled Tasks

Create scheduled tasks to execute code.

schtasks /create

Service Configuration

Modify Windows service binaries.

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services

📌 Example Commands

Add to Registry Run Key:

reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v MaliciousKey /t REG_SZ /d "C:\malware.exe"

Add to Startup Folder:

copy C:\malware.exe "C:\Users\<User>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"

Add to RunOnce Key:

reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce" /v Update /t REG_SZ /d "C:\malware.exe"

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

🕵️ Check Run and RunOnce Registry Keys

Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"

🕵️ Check Startup Folder for Suspicious Files

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"

🕵️ Check Scheduled Tasks for Suspicious Entries

Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.TaskPath -like "*Update*" }

🕵️ Check Service Binaries for Suspicious Paths

Get-WmiObject Win32_Service | Select-Object Name, PathName | Where-Object { $_.PathName -like "*Temp*" }

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

🕵️ Detect Registry Key Modifications

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "CurrentVersion\\Run" or RegistryKey contains "CurrentVersion\\RunOnce"
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, AccountName

🕵️ Detect Startup Folder Modifications

DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath contains "Startup"
| where ActionType == "FileCreated" or ActionType == "FileModified"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, AccountName

🕵️ Identify Suspicious Service Configurations

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services"
| where RegistryValueData contains "Temp" or RegistryValueData contains ".exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData

🕵️ Monitor Processes Executing from Startup Locations

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath contains "Startup"
| where FileName endswith ".exe" or FileName endswith ".bat"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName

📊 Event Viewer Logs

Event ID

Description

4657

A registry value was modified.

4688

A new process was created.

4697

A service was installed in the system.

4663

Object access attempt (Startup Folder changes).

📌 Focus on Event ID 4657:

Look for modifications to:
- HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
- HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce

📌 Focus on Event ID 4688:

Look for processes running from:
- C:\Users\<User>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup

📌 Focus on Event ID 4697:

Check for newly installed services.

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Identify Malicious Registry Entries

Look for unexpected keys in Run or RunOnce:

Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

2️⃣ Analyze Startup Folder

Identify suspicious files:

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"

3️⃣ Trace Malicious Processes

Correlate process activity:

Get-EventLog -LogName Security -InstanceId 4688 | Select-String "Startup"

4️⃣ Inspect Services for Persistence

Review service binaries:

Get-WmiObject Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.PathName -like "*Temp*" }

5️⃣ Review Scheduled Tasks

Look for unusual scheduled tasks:

Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.TaskPath -like "*Update*" }

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Remove Malicious Registry Keys

Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "MaliciousKey"

📌 2. Delete Malicious Startup Files

Remove-Item -Path "C:\Users\<User>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\malware.exe"

📌 3. Disable Malicious Services

sc stop "MaliciousService"
sc delete "MaliciousService"

📌 4. Terminate Suspicious Processes

Stop-Process -Name "malware" -Force

📌 5. Perform Full Antivirus Scan

Start-MpScan -ScanType FullScan

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

Enable Registry Auditing:
- Monitor Event ID 4657 for Run and RunOnce.
Restrict Startup Folder Access:
- Limit write permissions to startup folders.
Use Least Privilege Principle:
- Restrict admin rights to essential users.
Enable Application Control Policies:
- Block untrusted applications via AppLocker.
Monitor Suspicious Scheduled Tasks:
- Periodically audit scheduled tasks.
Regular Patching:
- Keep systems and software updated.

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

Registry Run Keys and Startup Folders are Common Persistence Mechanisms: Monitor them closely.
Event IDs 4657, 4688, 4697 Are Crucial: Set up alerts for modifications.
Audit Regularly: Periodically inspect registry keys and startup folders.
Enforce Application Whitelisting: Use tools like AppLocker.

🚨 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is Default Account Exploitation?

Default Accounts are built-in user accounts that come preconfigured with operating systems, applications, and network devices (e.g., Administrator, Guest, sa for SQL Server).
Attackers exploit these accounts if:
- Default credentials remain unchanged.
- Accounts are enabled by default.
- Accounts have excessive privileges.
- Weak passwords are set for these accounts.

📑 Why Attackers Target Default Accounts?

Easy Access: Many systems are deployed without disabling default accounts.
Privilege Escalation: Default accounts often have administrative or privileged access.
Persistence: Attackers use default accounts to maintain long-term access.
Stealth: Legitimate accounts are less likely to trigger alerts.

📌 Common Default Accounts and Services

Default Account

Platform/Service

Purpose

Administrator

Windows Systems

System Administrator

root

Linux/Unix Systems

Superuser Access

SQL Server

Database Admin

admin

Network Devices (Cisco, Fortinet)

Device Admin

Guest

Windows Systems

Restricted Access

postgres

PostgreSQL Database

Database Admin

Raspberry Pi

Device Admin

📌 Common Techniques for Exploiting Default Accounts

Technique

Description

Example Command

Brute Force Attack

Guess passwords for default accounts.

hydra -l admin -P passwords.txt <target>

Default Credential Login

Use known default credentials.

ssh root@<IP>

Account Misconfiguration

Exploit accounts left enabled.

net user Administrator

SQL Default Account

Exploit sa accounts in SQL Server.

sqlcmd -S <server> -U sa

Remote Access via Admin

Use default accounts over RDP/SSH.

mstsc /v:<IP>

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

🕵️ List Default Accounts in Windows

Get-LocalUser | Where-Object { $_.Name -in @("Administrator", "Guest") }

🕵️ Check if Default Accounts Are Enabled

Get-LocalUser | Where-Object { $_.Enabled -eq $true }

🕵️ List Accounts with Elevated Privileges

Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators"

🕵️ Check Recent Login Activity for Default Accounts

Get-EventLog -LogName Security -InstanceId 4624 | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*Administrator*" }

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

🕵️ Detect Default Account Logins

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4624
| where AccountName in ("Administrator", "Guest", "sa", "root", "admin")
| project Timestamp, AccountName, IpAddress, LogonType, DeviceName

🕵️ Identify Brute Force Attempts on Default Accounts

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4625
| where AccountName in ("Administrator", "Guest", "sa", "root", "admin")
| summarize FailedAttempts = count() by AccountName, IpAddress
| where FailedAttempts > 5

🕵️ Detect Default Account Modifications

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "SAM"
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, AccountName

🕵️ Monitor Default SQL Account Logins (sa)

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "sqlcmd"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-U sa"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName

🕵️ Identify Default Accounts Used for Remote Access

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemotePort in (3389, 22)
| where AccountName in ("Administrator", "root", "admin")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, AccountName

📊 Event Viewer Logs

Event ID

Description

4624

Successful login (Default accounts are often listed).

4625

Failed login attempt (Repeated attempts are suspicious).

4720

User account created.

4728

User added to privileged group.

4732

User added to global group.

📌 Focus on Event ID 4624:

Look for logins from:
- Administrator
- Guest
- sa
- root

📌 Focus on Event ID 4728:

Look for additions to groups like:
- Administrators
- Domain Admins

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Identify Enabled Default Accounts

Get-LocalUser | Where-Object { $_.Name -in @("Administrator", "Guest") -and $_.Enabled -eq $true }

2️⃣ Trace Account Activity

Check event logs for recent usage:

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4624} | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*Administrator*" }

3️⃣ Review Remote Access Logs

Investigate remote sessions:

Get-EventLog -LogName Security -InstanceId 4624 | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*RDP*" }

Verify sa account activity:

SELECT login_time, host_name, program_name FROM sys.dm_exec_sessions WHERE login_name = 'sa';

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Disable Unused Default Accounts

Disable-LocalUser -Name "Administrator"

📌 2. Enforce Strong Passwords for Default Accounts

net user Administrator StrongP@ssw0rd!

📌 3. Remove Default Accounts from Admin Groups

Remove-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" -Member "Administrator"

📌 4. Monitor SQL Server `sa` Account

Disable sa if not required:

ALTER LOGIN sa DISABLE;

📌 5. Enable Account Lockout Policies

net accounts /lockoutthreshold:5

📌 6. Perform Full Antivirus Scan

Start-MpScan -ScanType FullScan

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

Disable Default Accounts if Not Required:
- Disable accounts like Administrator, Guest, and sa.
Enforce Strong Password Policies:
- Ensure default accounts have strong, unique passwords.
Monitor Default Account Activity:
- Alert on usage of default accounts in remote sessions or privileged tasks.
Limit Default Account Permissions:
- Remove default accounts from sensitive groups.
Use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):
- Add MFA to privileged accounts.
Audit Regularly:
- Periodically review account usage logs and group memberships.

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

Default Accounts are Low-Hanging Fruit: Attackers often target them first.
Disable Unused Accounts: Remove or disable accounts like Administrator and Guest.
Monitor Account Activity: Use Event IDs 4624, 4625, 4728.
Enforce Strong Passwords: Always change default passwords.
Use Multi-Factor Authentication: Secure critical accounts with MFA.

🚨 Data Transfer Size Limits

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is Data Transfer Size Limit Abuse?

Attackers often manipulate data transfer limits to evade detection while exfiltrating large volumes of data from a compromised network.
By transferring data in smaller chunks or obfuscating file sizes, attackers can bypass Data Loss Prevention (DLP) controls and avoid raising red flags.

📑 Why Attackers Manipulate Data Transfer Size?

Avoid Detection: Small or irregular data transfers may not trigger monitoring tools.
Evade Threshold Alerts: Many DLP systems flag unusually large transfers.
Blend with Normal Traffic: Break data into chunks to mimic typical user behavior.
Exfiltrate Large Volumes Over Time: Steady, small transfers are harder to detect.

📌 Common Techniques for Data Transfer Size Manipulation

Technique

Description

Example Tools

Chunking

Split large data files into smaller pieces for gradual exfiltration.

split, 7zip

Compression

Compress files to reduce size before transfer.

gzip, WinRAR

Encryption/Obfuscation

Encrypt or encode data to hide its true size/type.

openssl, base64

Data Hiding

Embed data within other file types (e.g., images, PDFs).

steghide, ExifTool

Low-Bandwidth Channels

Use slow protocols (e.g., DNS tunneling) to avoid suspicion.

dnscat2, iodine

Alternate Protocols

Use FTP, SFTP, or HTTP for stealthy data transfer.

curl, scp

📌 Common Attack Scenarios

Chunked Transfers Over FTP: Files broken into small chunks and exfiltrated slowly.
HTTP POST Data Exfiltration: Small POST requests carrying encoded data.
DNS Tunneling for Data Transfers: Data exfiltrated over DNS queries.
Email Attachment Abuse: Data hidden in small email attachments.
Cloud Services Abuse: Small file uploads to cloud storage (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive).

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

🕵️ Monitor Unusual File Transfers

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\Documents" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.Length -gt 10485760 }

Flag files larger than 10MB.

🕵️ Monitor Recent Compressed Files

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\*" -Include *.zip, *.rar, *.7z -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24) }

🕵️ Inspect Network Connections for Large Transfers

Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -notlike "192.168.*" }

🕵️ Check Outbound DNS Traffic for Large Payloads

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational'}

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

🕵️ Detect Large File Transfers

DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == "FileCopied" or ActionType == "FileUploaded"
| where FileSize > 10485760 // Files larger than 10MB
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, AccountName, FileSize

🕵️ Monitor Chunked Data Transfers Over HTTP

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Protocol == "HTTP"
| where RemoteUrl contains "upload"
| summarize TotalDataTransferred = sum(NetworkBytesSent) by RemoteUrl, AccountName
| where TotalDataTransferred > 10485760

🕵️ Identify Compressed File Transfers

DeviceFileEvents
| where FileName endswith ".zip" or FileName endswith ".rar" or FileName endswith ".7z"
| where ActionType == "FileCopied"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, AccountName

🕵️ Detect DNS Tunneling Activity

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemotePort == 53
| where NetworkBytesSent > 512
| summarize TotalDataTransferred = sum(NetworkBytesSent) by RemoteIP
| where TotalDataTransferred > 1048576

🕵️ Monitor Email Attachments with Large Files

EmailEvents
| where AttachmentSize > 10485760
| project Timestamp, SenderEmailAddress, RecipientEmailAddress, AttachmentSize, FileName

📊 Event Viewer Logs

Event ID

Description

4663

Object Access: File copied or transferred.

5156

Network connection allowed (large data transfers).

4688

Process creation (e.g., curl, scp).

4104

PowerShell script block execution (e.g., split, base64).

6005

DNS requests (DNS tunneling detection).

📌 Focus on Event ID 4663:

Look for unusual file access or copying activity:

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4663} | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*copy*" }

📌 Focus on Event ID 5156:

Look for outbound connections with large amounts of data transferred.

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Analyze Network Traffic

Identify outbound traffic spikes to unknown destinations:

Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -notlike "192.168.*" }

2️⃣ Inspect Compressed/Archived Files

Search for recent .zip, .rar, or .7z files:

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\*" -Include *.zip, *.rar, *.7z -Recurse

3️⃣ Trace DNS Queries for Data Transfer

Identify large DNS payloads:

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational'}

4️⃣ Review HTTP/S Traffic for Repeated Small Transfers

Inspect log files for recurring patterns of file uploads.

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Block Malicious IPs

New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Block Suspicious IP" -Direction Outbound -RemoteAddress <IP> -Action Block

📌 2. Quarantine Suspicious Files

Move-Item -Path "C:\Users\*\Documents\large_archive.zip" -Destination "C:\Quarantine"

📌 3. Terminate Malicious Processes

Stop-Process -Name "curl" -Force

📌 4. Monitor DNS Traffic for Tunneling

Enable deep packet inspection on DNS traffic.

📌 5. Enable Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Policies

Apply limits to outbound file sizes.

📌 6. Perform Full Antivirus Scan

Start-MpScan -ScanType FullScan

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

Enable Data Loss Prevention (DLP):
- Set thresholds for maximum file sizes.
Implement Network Traffic Monitoring (NTM):
- Track large outbound connections.
Monitor DNS Traffic:
- Detect DNS tunneling patterns.
Block Unauthorized File Transfer Tools:
- Restrict tools like curl, scp, ftp.
Encrypt Sensitive Files:
- Prevent plaintext data exfiltration.
Implement Rate-Limiting Policies:
- Limit bandwidth for external file transfers.

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

Data Exfiltration Often Hides in Plain Sight: Small, frequent transfers can go unnoticed.
DNS and HTTP/S Are Common Channels: Monitor these protocols.
Compression and Obfuscation Are Common Tactics: Look for .zip, .rar, and .7z files.
Enable DLP Policies: Set file transfer thresholds.
Regular Auditing is Crucial: Monitor logs, network traffic, and DNS queries.

🚨 Process Doppelgängingysis

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is Process Doppelgänging?

Process Doppelgänging is an advanced code injection technique that bypasses antivirus and endpoint protection by exploiting the Windows NTFS transaction feature.
It allows attackers to create a malicious process in a way that:
- It does not create a new file on disk.
- It appears as a legitimate process.
- It bypasses process monitoring tools.

📑 Why Attackers Use Process Doppelgänging?

Stealth: Avoid detection by antivirus and monitoring tools.
Fileless Execution: No malicious file needs to be saved on disk.
Privilege Escalation: Run code with high privileges under a legitimate process name.
Persistence: Maintain stealthy access across reboots.

📌 How Does Process Doppelgänging Work?

Transacted File Creation: A malicious executable is written to disk using Windows NTFS transactions.
Rollback Transaction: The transaction is rolled back, making the file invisible.
Process Creation: The process is launched in a suspended state using the rollback file.
Mapped Section Replacement: Replace the memory section of the suspended process with malicious code.
Process Execution: Resume the process to execute the malicious payload.

📌 Common Tools for Process Doppelgänging

Tool

Purpose

Mimikatz

Credential theft

Cobalt Strike

Post-exploitation framework

Metasploit

Exploitation and payload delivery

Process Hacker

Memory and process manipulation

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

🕵️ Check for Suspicious Processes Running in Suspended State

Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.StartInfo.FileName -eq $null }

🕵️ Inspect Processes Without Valid Executable Paths

Get-CimInstance Win32_Process | Where-Object { $_.ExecutablePath -eq $null }

🕵️ Monitor NTFS Transactions

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-NTFS/Operational'; Id=142} | Select-Object TimeCreated, Message

🕵️ Inspect Process Tree Anomalies

Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Select-Object ProcessId, ParentProcessId, Name, CommandLine

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

🕵️ Detect Suspended Processes with Malicious Command Line

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCreationTime > ago(1d)
| where ProcessIntegrityLevel == "System"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "suspended"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, ParentProcessName, AccountName

🕵️ Look for NTFS Transaction Abuse

DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FolderPath contains "NTFS"
| where FileName endswith ".tmp"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, AccountName

🕵️ Identify Process Injection via Doppelgänging

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "NtCreateTransaction"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "NtRollbackTransaction"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, ParentProcessName, AccountName

🕵️ Identify Suspicious Child Processes

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ParentProcessFileName in ("svchost.exe", "explorer.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains ".exe"
| where ProcessCreationTime > ago(1d)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, ParentProcessName, AccountName

🕵️ Detect Memory Manipulation

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "VirtualAlloc"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "WriteProcessMemory"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, ParentProcessName, AccountName

📊 Event Viewer Logs

Event ID

Description

4688

A new process was created.

4656

A handle to an object was requested.

4663

An attempt was made to access an object.

142

NTFS transaction activity.

592

A new process was created (older systems).

📌 Focus on Event ID 4688:

Look for:

ProcessCommandLine: NtCreateTransaction
ParentProcess: svchost.exe, explorer.exe

📌 Focus on Event ID 142:

Check NTFS transaction logs for suspicious activity.

📌 Focus on Event ID 4663:

Look for access to unusual memory objects:
```
ObjectName: \Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy
```

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Trace Suspicious Processes

Identify parent-child process relationships:

Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Where-Object { $_.ParentProcessId -eq <PID> }

2️⃣ Inspect Memory Regions

Check for suspicious memory sections in processes:

Get-Process -Id <PID> | Select-Object Handles, NPM, PM, WS

3️⃣ Analyze NTFS Transactions

Investigate NTFS logs:

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-NTFS/Operational'; Id=142}

4️⃣ Check Recent Executable Activity

Identify recently created temporary executables:

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Windows\Temp\" -Recurse -Include *.tmp, *.exe

5️⃣ Trace DLL Injections

List loaded DLLs for suspicious processes:

Get-Process -Id <PID> -Module

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Terminate Suspicious Processes

Stop-Process -Id <PID> -Force

📌 2. Remove Malicious Files

Remove-Item -Path "C:\Windows\Temp\suspicious.exe" -Force

📌 3. Clear NTFS Transaction Logs

fsutil usn deletejournal /d /n c:

📌 4. Isolate Compromised Hosts

Disconnect the system from the network.

📌 5. Perform Full Antivirus Scan

Start-MpScan -ScanType FullScan

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

Enable Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP):
- Monitor advanced attack techniques.
Enable Process Auditing:
- Monitor Event IDs 4688, 4663, 142.
Disable Unnecessary NTFS Features:
- Limit NTFS transactions if not required.
Use Application Control (AppLocker/WDAC):
- Block untrusted binaries.
Apply Patches and Updates:
- Keep Windows OS updated.
Restrict Admin Privileges:
- Limit the ability to create NTFS transactions.
Educate Admins and IT Staff:
- Raise awareness about fileless attacks.

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

Process Doppelgänging is Stealthy: It bypasses traditional antivirus solutions.
Focus on NTFS Logs: Event ID 142 can reveal NTFS transaction abuse.
Monitor Suspended Processes: Check for processes with VirtualAlloc and WriteProcessMemory.
Use Threat Intelligence: Stay updated on tools like Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike.
Implement Application Whitelisting: Prevent untrusted binaries from executing.

🚨 Spearphishing via Service: Advanced Threat Analysis

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is Spearphishing via Service?

Spearphishing via Service is a technique where attackers exploit trusted third-party services (e.g., collaboration tools, cloud platforms, email services) to deliver malicious payloads or phishing links.
Common targets include:
- Microsoft 365 (Outlook, Teams, SharePoint)
- Google Workspace (Gmail, Drive, Docs)
- Cloud Storage Platforms (Dropbox, OneDrive, Box)
- Communication Platforms (Slack, Discord)

📑 Why Attackers Use Spearphishing via Service?

Trusted Platforms: Emails and links originating from known services bypass traditional security filters.
Spoofing Trust: Legitimate domains increase user trust and click-through rates.
Bypass Email Security: Emails from trusted domains are less likely to be flagged.
Credential Harvesting: Fake login prompts on known services fool users.
Payload Delivery: Malicious attachments or links are hosted on legitimate platforms.

📌 Common Techniques Used in Spearphishing via Service

Technique

Description

Example

Cloud Hosted Payloads

Malicious files hosted on cloud services.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/123xyz

Fake Login Pages

Spoofed service login pages.

https://microsoft-login.xyz

Embedded Malicious Macros

Documents with hidden malicious scripts.

Document.docm

URL Shorteners

Obscure malicious links.

bit.ly/abc123

OAuth Token Theft

Abuse OAuth permissions for unauthorized access.

https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth

Service Account Hijacking

Compromise legitimate service accounts.

Attacker takes over user@domain.com

📌 Common Attack Scenarios

Malware via OneDrive Link: A document hosted on OneDrive contains embedded malware.
Phishing via Teams Message: Fake login page sent through Microsoft Teams.
OAuth Abuse in Google Workspace: Attacker gains access via rogue OAuth app.
Fake Dropbox Notification: “Your document is ready, click here to view.”

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

🕵️ Search Recent Suspicious Emails

Get-EventLog -LogName Security | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*phishing*" }

🕵️ Monitor Downloads from Cloud Services

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\Downloads" | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24) }

🕵️ Check for Suspicious URLs in Logs

Get-WinEvent -LogName Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational | Where-Object { $_.Message -like "*http*" }

🕵️ Inspect Browser History for Suspicious Links

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\History"

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

🕵️ Identify Suspicious URLs in Emails

EmailEvents
| where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
| where ThreatTypes contains "Phishing"
| where Url contains "drive.google.com" or Url contains "dropbox.com"
| project Timestamp, SenderEmailAddress, RecipientEmailAddress, ThreatTypes, Url

🕵️ Detect Malicious Document Downloads

DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath contains "Downloads"
| where FileName endswith ".docm" or FileName endswith ".xlsm"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, AccountName

🕵️ Identify OAuth Token Abuse

CloudAppEvents
| where ActionType == "OAuthGrant"
| where AppDisplayName contains "Unknown"
| project Timestamp, AppDisplayName, AccountName, IpAddress

🕵️ Monitor Microsoft Teams/Slack Activity

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "teams.exe" or ProcessCommandLine contains "slack.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "http"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName

🕵️ Check for Suspicious File Execution

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath contains "Downloads"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains ".docm" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".js"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName

📊 Event Viewer Logs

Event ID

Description

4688

A new process was created.

4663

Object access attempt (e.g., file download).

4104

PowerShell script block logging.

5156

Network connection allowed (HTTP/S requests).

1202

OAuth grant (Azure AD).

📌 Focus on Event ID 4688:

Look for:

ProcessName: powershell.exe
ProcessCommandLine: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://malicious.link"

📌 Focus on Event ID 4663:

File downloaded from:

FolderPath: C:\Users\<User>\Downloads
FileType: .docm, .xlsm

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Analyze Malicious URLs

Verify URL reputation:
- VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com
- URLScan: https://urlscan.io

2️⃣ Inspect OAuth Grants

Review recent OAuth permissions:

Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $true

3️⃣ Trace Malicious Downloads

List recent downloads:

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\Downloads"

Check file hash:

Get-FileHash -Path "C:\Users\User\Downloads\malware.docm"

4️⃣ Inspect User Activity

Review sign-in logs:

SigninLogs
| where AppDisplayName contains "Microsoft Teams"
| where Status == "Failure"

5️⃣ Check OAuth Audit Logs

Look for suspicious app grants:

AuditLogs
| where OperationName == "Consent to application"

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Revoke OAuth Permissions

Revoke malicious OAuth grants:

Remove-AzureADServiceAppRoleAssignment

📌 2. Quarantine Malicious Files

Move-Item -Path "C:\Users\User\Downloads\malware.docm" -Destination "C:\Quarantine"

📌 3. Block Malicious URLs

New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Block Malicious URL" -Direction Outbound -RemoteAddress <IP> -Action Block

📌 4. Reset Compromised Accounts

Force password reset:

net user User NewP@ssw0rd!

📌 5. Terminate Malicious Processes

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

Enable Safe Links and Safe Attachments (Microsoft 365):
- Prevent malicious URLs and attachments.
Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):
- Reduce credential theft risk.
Block Macros by Default:
- Prevent execution of malicious macros.
Restrict OAuth Consent:
- Require admin approval for OAuth permissions.
Train Users:
- Educate employees about phishing indicators.
Enable DLP (Data Loss Prevention):
- Monitor cloud-based file activities.

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

Spearphishing via Services Leverages Trust: Hosted on legitimate services like OneDrive or Dropbox.
OAuth is a Growing Attack Vector: Monitor app grants closely.
Focus on Event IDs: 4688, 4663, 5156, 1202.
Use Threat Intelligence Tools: Validate links with VirusTotal and URLScan.
User Awareness is Key: Continuous training is essential.

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🚨 Exploitation of Remote Services

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is Exploitation of Remote Services?

📑 Why Attackers Exploit Remote Services?

📌 Common Exploited Services and Techniques

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

📊 Event Viewer Logs

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Trace Failed Authentication Attempts

2️⃣ Identify Active Remote Sessions

3️⃣ Inspect Process Activity Related to Remote Services

4️⃣ Check Open Ports

5️⃣ Review Suspicious Network Connections

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Terminate Unauthorized Sessions

📌 2. Disable Unused Remote Services

📌 3. Reset Compromised Accounts

📌 4. Block Suspicious IPs

📌 5. Patch Known Vulnerabilities

📌 6. Enable Network Level Authentication (NLA) for RDP

📌 7. Perform Full Antivirus Scan

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

🚨 File and Directory Discovery: Advanced Threat Analysis

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is File and Directory Discovery?

📑 Why Attackers Use File and Directory Discovery?

📌 Common Techniques for File and Directory Discovery

📊 Common Tools Used

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

📊 Event Viewer Logs

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Identify Suspicious File Access Commands

2️⃣ Trace Process Tree

3️⃣ Inspect Access to Sensitive Folders

4️⃣ Identify Recently Accessed Files

5️⃣ Analyze Command History

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Revoke Unnecessary File Permissions

📌 2. Monitor Critical Directories

📌 3. Quarantine Suspicious Processes

📌 4. Remove Unauthorized Access

📌 5. Perform Full Antivirus Scan

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

🚨 Persistence via Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is Persistence via Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder?

📑 Why Attackers Use These Techniques?

📌 Common Techniques for Persistence

📌 Example Commands

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📊 Manual Inspection with PowerShell

📊 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Query (KQL)

📊 Event Viewer Logs

🕵️ 3. Investigation Techniques

1️⃣ Identify Malicious Registry Entries

2️⃣ Analyze Startup Folder

3️⃣ Trace Malicious Processes

4️⃣ Inspect Services for Persistence

5️⃣ Review Scheduled Tasks

🔧 4. Remediation Steps

📌 1. Remove Malicious Registry Keys

📌 2. Delete Malicious Startup Files

📌 3. Disable Malicious Services

📌 4. Terminate Suspicious Processes

📌 5. Perform Full Antivirus Scan

🛡️ 5. Prevention Steps

🧠 6. Key Takeaways

🚨 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts

🔍 1. Attack Breakdown

📝 What is Default Account Exploitation?

📑 Why Attackers Target Default Accounts?

📌 Common Default Accounts and Services

📌 Common Techniques for Exploiting Default Accounts

🛡️ 2. Detection Techniques

📌 4. Monitor SQL Server `sa` Account